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Abstract: The article examines the USA’s international religious freedom policy during the presidency
of Donald Trump. It argues that the Trump administration consistently prioritised America’s
international religious freedom (IRF) policy according to Judeo-Christian values. This contrasted with
previous administrations, which did not pursue such a clear Christocentric approach. The Trump
administration has pursued the policy with vigour, drawing on Judeo-Christian ideology and
prioritising religious freedom above other human rights, such as equality for women and sexual
minorities. The article begins with a brief summary of the International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA),
signed into law by President Clinton in 1998. It then examines the influence of Judeo-Christian
ideology on Trump’s international religious freedom policy. To do this, the article surveys three recent
initiatives: the Commission on Unalienable Rights, the annual Ministerial to Advance International
Religious Freedom, and the International Religious Freedom Alliance. I argue that collectively the
initiatives promote the paramountcy of Judeo-Christian ideology. The article concludes that the
Trump administration’s international religious freedom is strongly informed by a Judeo-Christian
ideology which seeks to place religious freedom first in a hierarchy of human rights, while relegating
others, especially equality for females and sexual minorities, to a lesser position.
Keywords: religious and politics; freedom; minorities; ideology
1. Introduction
International religious freedom (IRF) is an issue of great significance for American foreign policy.
From the 1990s, International religious freedom was a key concern for both religious and secular human
rights advocacy groups (Haynes 2008). Initially, however, the Clinton administration was indifferent
to the issue (Bettiza 2019). This was not because the Clinton administration believed the issue to be
unimportant but because it did not the issue as one that needed prioritising. To try to change the
administration’s view, an alliance of human rights advocacy groups successfully lobbied Congress and
other arms of government. President Clinton signed into law the International Religious Freedom Act
(IRFA) in 19981. The Act identified international religious freedom as a core facet of America’s foreign
policy. Successive administrations have pursued IRF. The Trump administration’s policy on IRF is
characterised both by its enthusiasm and by its distinctive ideological position (Casey 2017, 2020).
The ideological focus was notable from April 2018, when Mike Pompeo was appointed as Secretary of
State. Pompeo, an evangelical Christian, applied a Judeo-Christian division perspective to America’s
IRF policy, which emphasised Pompeo’s personal view that religious freedom is first among human
rights (Casey 2017, 2020; Stewart 2020). Pompeo’s approach was viewed with alarm by mainstream
1 IRFA aims ‘To condemn violations of religious freedom, and to promote, and to assist other governments in the promotion
of, the fundamental right to freedom of religion.’ (https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?path=/prelim@title22/chapter73&
edition=prelim).
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human rights advocacy groups, both religious and secular. While they did not disagree on the
desirability of international religious freedom, they questioned Pompeo’s Judeo-Christian approach
(Verma 2020).
Expressed in the Constitution of 1788, religious freedom is a foundational component of US culture
and values. During World War II, the US government portrayed the “Christian” West’s fight against
fascism/Nazism as an international struggle between ‘good’ and ‘evil’. In 1948, leading American
Christians, notably the then first lady, Eleanor Roosevelt, were instrumental in crafting the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), a fundamental document of the United Nations2. During the
Cold War, America’s ideological battle with the Soviet Union emphasised the USA’s Christian culture
and the USSR’s “God-less” one. After the Cold War, US foreign policy prioritised human rights,
including religious freedom, democracy, and anti-slavery and human trafficking. As already noted,
promulgation of international religious freedom was the motive for the 1998 IRFA. While in the early
2000s, both Bush and Obama administrations pursued IRF policies with “an implicit Christian soft
spot”, the Trump presidency prioritised “attention to Christian concerns and communities” which
became “even more overt and explicit” (Bettiza 2019, p. 223).
The article’s first section briefly examines the Bush and Obama administrations’ IRFA policy.
The second section surveys the Trump administration’s IRF policy via an examination of three of
Pompeo’s initiatives: the Commission on Unalienable Rights, the annual Ministerial to Advance
International Religious Freedom, and the International Religious Freedom Alliance. All were introduced
in 2018–2019. The article concludes that while the Trump administration brought fresh attention to
America’s IRF policy, the application of Judeo-Christian values and beliefs had the possibly unintended
impact of undermining the rights of women and sexual minorities.
Before proceeding, a few words about methodology. Research for the article was conducted by
analysing relevant policy speeches, statements, remarks, press conferences, writings, and interviews of
relevant figures in the Trump administration, including President Trump, Vice-President Mike Pence,
and Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo. In addition, the research drew on primary source data, including
policy documents and legislation. The research was also informed by critiques of and commentary
on the Trump administration’s IRF policy from scholars, human rights advocates and journalists.
The overall aim was to employ a range of appropriate sources in order to present a balanced view of
the Trump administration’s IRF policy.
1.1. From Advocacy to Law: The International Religious Freedom Act of 1998
This section briefly examines the origins and early development of IRFA. The Act was a bipartisan,
consensual effort in the 1990s to persuade an initially indifferent administration to take international
religious freedom seriously. Religious human rights advocacy groups were instrumental in helping
create a new architecture for human rights’ monitoring and advocacy in American foreign policy
(Green et al. 2003; Hertzke 2006; Haynes 2008). According to Hertzke (2006), this involved an
‘unlikely alliance’. It comprised Protestant Evangelicals, Conservative Catholics, mainline Protestants,
progressive Catholics, Jews, Copts, Buddhists, Baha’is, Jehovah’s Witnesses, and Scientologists.
All agreed that “religious freedom [w]as a neglected norm that needed greater attention” (Bettiza 2019,
pp. 65–66). The “unlikely alliance” convinced an initially sceptical Congress to support the goal of
enhanced IRF, encouraging an originally indifferent President Clinton to sign the Act into law. Bettiza
(2019, p. 65) reports that the alliance’s lobbying was successful due to a shift ‘from a particularist
Christocentric discourse to a more universalistic religious freedom one [that] was pivotal in ensuring
2 Roosevelt served as First Lady of the United States from 4 March 1933 to 12 April 1945, during her husband President
Franklin D. Roosevelt’s four terms in office. She was the longest-serving First Lady of the United States. Roosevelt was chair
of the United Nations Human Rights Commission, instrumental in the creation of the UDHR. Roosevelt was a lifelong
Protestant Christian, a member of the Episcopalian church, and regularly attended church services (Glendon 2010).
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that a controversial act’, which authorised the State Department ‘to be systematically involved in global
religious matters’, received Congress’s undivided approval and President Clinton’s assent.
Following IRFA, three related Acts were introduced in the early 2000s:
• The Trafficking Victims Protection Act (2000): The Act targeted international crime syndicates
who sent children and women, mainly from the Global South, into prostitution and sweatshops in
many parts of the world (Lobasz 2019).
• The Sudan Peace Act (2002): Christian evangelicals championed the Act, outraged by Sudan’s
Islamist government’s persecution of southern Sudanese Christians and animists. The Act and its
accompanying sanctions were influential in helping to develop the road map for Sudan’s ceasefire
(2003) and subsequent peace treaty (2004) (Srinivasan 2014).
• The North Korea Human Rights Act (2004): Christian evangelicals and Korean Americans strongly
lobbied for this Act. It encouraged the Bush administration both to aid North Korean defectors
and to draw attention to its government’s egregious human rights violations and nuclear weapons
programme (Chang 2006).
Collectively, the three Acts focused on a global issue—human trafficking and slavery—and two
specific country-based concerns: persecution of Sudan’s religious minorities and in North Korea, a
general denial of human rights, including religious freedom. The Acts also highlighted two attributes
of the “unlikely alliance”. The first was the inter-faith consensus which transcended conventional
particularist interest group politics, bringing together various faith groups in pursuit of a common goal.
The second was the alliance’s strong support for the Bush and Obama administrations’ international
concern with minorities’ human rights. During the former, there was sustained support for females’
rights in Afghanistan and a wide-ranging and high-profile HIV/AIDS programme: the President’s
Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) (McAlister 2019).
The Obama administration’s foreign policy supported human rights for sexual minorities,
including for LGBTQ+ (Lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender, questioning/queer) individuals and
communities (Cooper 2015; McAlister 2019; Marsden 2020). During the Obama administration, IRFA
was strengthened by two additional pieces of legislation: the Near East and South Central Asia
Religious Freedom Act (2014), which included a regional Special Advisor for Religious Minorities,
and the Frank R. Wolf International Religious Freedom Act (2016). The Wolf Act required (1) the
executive to compose and announce a Special Watch List for countries which seemed to the US
government to be significantly denying religious freedom to significant numbers of their citizens, and
(2) compilation of both ‘Entities of Particular Concern and ‘Designated Persons’ lists. These were aimed
at non-state actors, notably Islamic State, at the time egregiously abusing many persons’ religious
freedom in territory it briefly controlled. In addition, the Wolf Act committed the State Department to
an online training course on IRF for all foreign service officers (Marsden 2020, p. 4). In sum, over time
additional measures were added to IRFA in order to strengthen and deepen US commitment to IRF,
including in relation to females and sexual minorities’ human rights.
This section has noted a consensual and bipartisan approach to international religious freedom
from an alliance of faith groups during the Clinton, Bush, and Obama presidencies. It also noted the
administrations’ Christocentric approach, which was nevertheless pliable enough to feature a range
of concerns, including anti-AIDS and pro-LGBTQ+ policies, as well as a focus on particular regions
of especial concern, such as the Near East and South Central Asia. The next section examines the
Trump administration’s approach to IRF, explaining that the erstwhile consensus dissolved following
a relatively narrow interpretation of IRF which, critics allege, privileged Judeo-Christian values
and beliefs.
1.2. The Trump Administration and Judeo-Christian Values and Beliefs
The US policy on international religious freedom has been extensively surveyed. Farr (2008)
summary of the moral and ethical desirability of IRF is a thoughtful analysis which commands wide
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attention3. He argues that promoting religious freedom around the world is not just a good thing
in itself. It is also a necessary component of a foreign policy which aims to be both just and ethical.
Hurd (2015) regards America’s IRF policy as designed to aid the USA’s bid for international hegemony,
via an “approved list” of religious minorities which the USA would seek to assist, but without concern
for those not on the list. Hurd (2015, pp. 5, 35) argues that protections for the rights of religious
minorities have “gone viral” and “the good religion-bad religion mandate has become an industry”.
Joustra (2016) contends that what Hurd is dissatisfied with is not “religion, or religious freedom,
but really with the project of liberalism”. That is, protection of religious freedom around the world is a
project of liberalism, along with other human rights such as democracy, equality, and the rights of
minorities. In June 2020, President Trump issued Executive Order 13,926 referring to IRF as a moral
and national security issue:
Religious freedom, America’s first freedom, is a moral and national security imperative.
Religious freedom for all people worldwide is a foreign policy priority of the United States,
and the United States will respect and vigorously promote this freedom. As stated in the 2017
National Security Strategy, our Founders understood religious freedom not as a creation of the
state, but as a gift of God to every person and a right that is fundamental for the flourishing of
our society. (https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2020/06/05/2020-12430/advancing-
international-religious-freedom).
President Trump’s comments underline that religious freedom is a core concern of both domestic
and foreign policy. He believes that it was granted not by governments but ‘as a gift of God’4. However,
unlike Joustra (2016), Philpott (2020), Barker (2020), Casey (2020), and others, Trump asserts the
paramountcy of religious freedom (“America’s first freedom”) over other human rights. Trump affirms
that if foreign governments deny religious freedom to their citizens, then the USA “will respect and
vigorously promote this freedom”. The notion that human rights are a creation of God, not of humans,
is a core belief of those adhering to Judeo-Christian ideology. This section, and those that follow,
examine the claim that the Trump administration used IRF policy not only to pursue and further
Judeo-Christian values and beliefs but also to emphasise Christians’ religious freedom which might,
perhaps unintentionally, undermine the human rights of females and sexual minorities.
Philpott welcomes Trump’s support of international religious freedom, especially the claim that it
“is a moral and national security imperative”. Philpott points to recent killings of “several hundred
Christians . . . killed in Nigeria”, China’s “brutal crackdown on churches” and incarceration of “a
million Uighur Muslims”, and the “high” or “very high” multi-faith religious restrictions on religion
in around 50 other countries. These moral issues are augmented by concerns for US national security.
“Religious freedom mitigates terrorism and civil war, strengthens democracy, enhances economic
development, fosters peace, enables reconciliation and advances opportunities for women” (Philpott
2020).
Barker underlines Philpott’s concern with widespread multi-faith religious restrictions in numerous
countries. Religious persecution “target[s] the most vulnerable, particularly religious minorities,
non-believers, converts from the majority religion, and those who otherwise dissent from or reject
the religious establishment”. Further, there are many other threats to religious freedom, including:
“technology-enabled state repression of religion, non-state violence aided by inept governance,
and blasphemy and apostasy laws that are regularly weaponized against religious minorities or
3 In 1999, Tom Farr became the first director of the State Department’s Office of International Religious Freedom. Currently
(July 2020), he is president of the Religious Freedom Institute, an NGO working to achieve worldwide acceptance of
religious freedom.
4 Martin Castro, appointed by President Obama to chair the US Commission on Civil Rights, writes that religious freedom is
often used as a “code word” for “discrimination, intolerance, racism, sexism, homophobia, Islamophobia,” and “Christian
supremacy” (Peaceful Coexistence 2016, p. 30).
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dissenters”. To try to deal with any or all of these threats, “new forms of [international] cooperation”
are essential (Barker 2020).
Casey (2017), Special Representative for Religion and Global Affairs at the Department of State
during the Obama presidency, agrees that there are moral and national security concerns encouraging
the US government to seek improved global religious freedom. Casey contends however that under
President Trump, “[e]ngagement with religious actors and communities has dissolved from the global,
inclusive, strategy of the previous [Obama] administration to an almost exclusively conservative
Christian, primarily Protestant, engagement”. As already mentioned, this is also a concern noted by
Bettiza (2019, p. 223).
Critics allege that during the Trump presidency, IRF policy was strongly influenced by
Judeo-Christian values and beliefs (Stewart 2020; Sherratt 2019; Bump 2019; Verma 2020). What are
Judeo-Christian values and beliefs? According to Altshuler (2016), they derive from a belief that
culturally, socially, and politically, US principles and achievements reflect “fundamental values of
Western society that are believed to come from both Judaism and Christianity”. Rabbi Shmuley Boteach,
an American Orthodox Jewish rabbi, claims that “Judeo-Christian values are the underpinning of
Western civilization” (Boteach quoted in Altshuler 2016).
Critics aver that Judeo-Christian values privilege religious freedom over other human rights.
According to Jews for a Secular Democracy5,
Listen to any religious-right pundit discuss the intersection of governing and faith, and
you’ll likely hear them refer to Judeo-Christian values. Take Focus on the Family (FOTF), for
example, a fundamentalist Christian advocacy organization with a public policy approach
self-described as ‘drawn from the wisdom of the Bible and the Judeo-Christian ethic’. Under
this guise of Judeo-Christian values, FOTF opposes same-sex marriage and LGBTQ equality,
staunchly lobbies against abortion and reproductive freedom, and promotes creationism and
abstinence-only sex education. (Jews for a Secular Democracy 2019)6
These comments reflect that, in the USA and many other countries, human rights debates take
place in a polarised political, social, and cultural climate (Haynes 2017, 2019). Bob argues that such
discourses have ‘great utility in political conflict’. The rights involved are not necessarily the essential
objectives over which opposing entities compete. Bob emphasises that they ‘fight over a wide range of
substantive demands and hope that using rights-oriented discourses could reinforce their political
interests’ (Bob 2019a, p. 16). This suggests that, because many understandings of rights are influenced
by political and ideological considerations, then the language of rights is used to try to achieve
proponents’ objectives. The latter are not necessarily concerned only with rights but may also involve
additional political, social and/or cultural objectives (Schwartz 2019).
Schake (2017), director of foreign and defence policy at the American Enterprise Institute7, claims
that the Trump administration focuses on an issue of key Judeo-Christian importance: strong support
for Israel. Judeo-Christian values also include strong defence of religious freedom. The Trump
administration is enthusiastic in this regard, targeting, inter alia, communist states (China, Vietnam,
North Korea) and several Muslim-majority countries (including Pakistan and Turkey). The US focus is
on Muslim Uighurs and Tibetan Buddhists (China), and religious minorities, including Ahmadis and
5 ‘Jews for a Secular Democracy is a pluralistic initiative of the Society for Humanistic Judaism’ (https://jfasd.org/2019/10/why-
judeo-christian-values-are-problematic/).
6 James Dobson, founder and head of Focus on the Family, is a strong supporter of President Trump (Dobson 2019). Dobson
is also a friend and ideological ally of Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo. See Dobson’s 2020 interview with Pompeo at
https://www.state.gov/secretary-michael-r-pompeo-with-dr-james-dobson-of-family-talk-with-james-dobson/ We refer to
this interview in the conclusion of this article.
7 The American Enterprise Institute describes itself as: “a public policy think tank dedicated to defending human dignity,
expanding human potential, and building a freer and safer world”. (https://www.aei.org/about/).
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Alevis (Pakistan and Turkey)8. In sum, the Trump administration highlights persecution of all several
groups, including Christians and non-mainstream Muslims (Philpott 2020; Barker 2020).
America’s IRF policy is the concern of five separate entities:
• The Office of International Religious Freedom (OIRF), established in 1998 by the IRFA and
controlled by the State Department.
• The United States Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF), established in 1998
by the IRFA and independent of the State Department.
• The Ministerial on Religious Freedom, an annual event, established in 2018 by Secretary of State,
Mike Pompeo.
• The Commission on Unalienable Rights, established in 2019 by Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo.
• The International Religious Freedom Alliance, established in 2020 by Secretary of State,
Mike Pompeo.
Let us examine them to assess their impact on America’s IRF policy.
1.3. The Office of International Religious Freedom and the United States Commission on International
Religious Freedom
The OIRF and USCIRF separately release annual reports on international religious freedom9.
The OIRF’s annual report is a global survey of religious freedom, compiled by employees of the State
Department. The USCIRF is an independent, bipartisan federal government entity, whose annual report
highlights, for consideration by the Executive Branch, ‘countries of particular concern’ (Frequently
Asked Questions 2020).
The relationship between OIRF and USCIRF is sometimes problematic. This is explicable when we
bear in mind that each has different priorities: those of the State Department and Congress. The OIRF
is concerned with the incumbent administration’s IRF policy, while the USCIRF prioritise Congress’s
concerns (Bettiza 2019, pp. 67–68). To be more effective, Casey (2020) argues that the OIRF ‘should be
led by a career diplomat and not a political appointee’, as it has been since IRFA became law in 1998.
He adds that: ‘This would help take politics out of religious freedom and allow a president to seat an
ambassador quickly and eliminate the inevitable year-long wait each term for a political appointee
to be vetted and confirmed by the Senate’. May (2019) argues that ‘[s]ome members of Congress
disapprove of USCIRF. They object to its prioritization of “‘freedom of religion or belief’—which I
[May] regard as the most foundational right, the right upon which all others are built—over what they
consider most important: expanding rights for select grievance communities”. These highlight two
issues said to bedevil the USCIRF: (1) it is a politicised body, and (2) it reflects the views of Congress,
which may not be vigorous in defence of religious freedom.
The USCIRF comprises nine members, all political appointees10. Members are appointed by the
two main political parties (Democratic and Republican) in the Senate and the House of Representatives,
as well as by the president. The USCIRF annually reports on what it sees as the effectiveness of the State
Department’s efforts to promote international religious freedom, and highlights perceived deficiencies.
Until June 2020, the chair of USCIRF was Tony Perkins, president of the Family Research Council, ‘a
religious public policy organization that provides research and advocacy on issues related to religious
8 For details, see USCIRF’s annual reports at: https://www.uscirf.gov/reports-briefs/annual-report).
9 In addition, there was the Office of Religion and Global Affairs (RGA), established in 2013 during the Obama presidency.
In August 2017, the then Secretary of State, Rex Tillerson, announced that the RGA was to be absorbed into the OIRF. (Bettiza
2019, p. 224).
10 At the time of writing (July 2020), the Commission comprised eight commissioners, following the resignations of former
chair Tenzin Dorjee (May 2020), Kristina Arriaga de Bucholz (November 2019) and Andy Khawaja (December 2019). Details
of USCIRF commissioners at https://www.uscirf.gov/about-uscirf/commissioners.
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freedom’11 Perkins was appointed in May 2018 by Mitch McConnell (R), Senate Majority Leader, for
a two-year term, renewed in May 2020 for two more years. Perkins was elected in July 2019 by his
fellow commissioners to chair USCIRF (Tony Perkins Elected 2019). The Commission also elected two
Vice Chairs in July 2019: Gayle Manchin, former first lady of West Virginia, appointed in April 2018
to the Commission by Charles Schumer (D), Senate Minority Leader, and Nadine Maenza, founding
Executive Director of Patriot Voices, appointed to the Commission in May 2018 by President Trump.
In July 2020, the members of the Commission were: Gayle Manchin, chair; Tony Perkins, vice-chair,
Anurima Bhargava, civil rights lawyer, vice-chair; Nury Turkel, civil rights lawyer and Uighur rights
advocate; Gary Bauer, former Senior Vice President of Focus on the Family and President of the
Family Research Council; Johnnie Moore, founder and CEO of the KAIROS Company and President of
The Congress of Christian Leaders; and James W. Carr, President and Chairman of Highland Home
Holdings and on the Board of Directors of World Christian Broadcasting. Finally, Sam Brownback,
Ambassador-at-Large for International Religious Freedom, serves ex officio on the USCIRF12.
Casey (2020) claims that USCIRF ‘has been dominated since its founding by conservative Christians
who advance a pro-Christian bias and a partisan anti-Democratic political agenda’13. USCIRF is said
to be influenced by Judeo-Christian ideology, encouraging a strong concern with Christians’ religious
freedom (Afandi 2011; Bettiza 2019; Bump 2019; Casey 2020; Stewart 2020; Taylor 2019; McAlister
2019). Pandey (2020), a senior politician in India’s ruling BJP party, alleges that several members
of USCIRF—including, Perkins, Maenza, Bauer, Carr, and Moore—are ‘associated with Christian
Missionary activities [in India]’ and ‘have been supporting aggressive expansion of Christianity all
their lives which includes demonizing other religions’. Do such claims stand up to scrutiny? Pandey’s
comments came following USCIRF’s 2019 report which stated that in India: “religious freedom
conditions . . . experienced a drastic turn downward, with religious minorities under increasing assault”
(USCIRF United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, p. 20). On the other hand,
undermining claims of USCIRF’s Christian bias is the overall focus of its comprehensive annual reports,
which regularly run to more than 100 pages. They scrupulously detail abuses of religious freedoms in
many countries, highlighting the plights not only of persecuted Christians but also of other religious
minorities. Finally, the USCIRF is an advisory body. The State Department makes IRF policy. Is the
State Department subject to Judeo-Christian ideology in relation to its IRF policy? The next section
looks into this issue, examining three State Department bodies concerned with IRF.
1.4. Additions to International Religious Freedom Policy during the Trump Administration
Following President Trump’s sacking of his predecessor, Rex Tillerson, Michael R. Pompeo
became Secretary of State in April 2018. Pompeo quickly introduced three major IRF initiatives:
The Commission on Unalienable Rights; the annual Ministerial to Advance Religious Freedom; and
the International Religious Freedom Alliance.
2. The Commission on Unalienable Rights
The Commission on Unalienable Rights, announced on 8 July 2019, advises Pompeo on ‘the
role of human rights in American foreign policy’ (Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo Remarks to
the Press 2019). The day before, Pompeo put his name to a Wall Street Journal “op ed” (“opposite
the editorial page”) where he stated that the Commission’s “mission” was not “to discover new
11 Perkins claims that pedophilia is a ‘homosexual problem’ and LGBTQ activists want to ‘destroy’ America (Tony Perkins
n.d.). The then vice-chair of USCIR, Gayle Manchin, was elected chair of USCIRF by her fellow commissioners in June 2020,
replacing Perkins. Perkins was elected as a vice-chair, as was Anurima Bhargava. The term of office for Manchin, Perkins
and Bhargava was June 2020 to June 2021.
12 According to McAlister (2019, fn. 1), ‘Brownback’s nomination to the Ambassador position was fiercely contested by LGBTQ
groups and he was only approved when VP Pence cast a tie-breaking vote.
13 Casey is currently (July 2020) Director of the Berkley Center for Religion, Peace, and World Affairs at Georgetown University.
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principles but to ground our discussion of human rights in America’s founding principles” (Pompeo
2019). Pompeo asked the Commission to come up with recommendations how US foreign policy
could best protect and promote ‘fundamental’ or ‘unalienable’ rights, said to be foundational in
both the USA’s ‘founding principles’ and the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).
According to Pompeo, the Commission’s aim was to “provide fresh thinking about human rights
discourse where such discourse has departed from our nation’s founding principles of natural law and
natural rights” (Morello 2019). Pompeo believes that ‘novel’ human rights have been enshrined in
international comprehension for only a few decades, following the UDHR’s creation (Haynes 2017,
2019). According to Pompeo (2019), supposedly universal, one-size-fits-all human rights affirmations
after the UDHR are both essential and non-essential; only the former are core needs.
The USCIRF chair, Tony Perkins, commended the Commission, stating that:
USCIRF is very pleased that the State Department is continuing to make human rights
an integral part of U.S. foreign policy and relations. We applaud the creation of this
Commission as another way of ensuring that the protection of these fundamental rights—the
most foundational of which is freedom of religion or belief—is a core element of strategic
policy discussions. (USCIRF Statement 2019)
Mainstream human rights advocacy groups were unimpressed by the Commission. They were
concerned that its findings would ‘strengthen Trump’s conservative social agenda, with the
administration unhappy that human rights are cited to uphold reproductive freedom or protect
LGBTQ people from discrimination’. According to Kenneth Roth of Human Rights Watch such fears
were “only intensified by Pompeo’s selection of Mary Ann Glendon, a prominent scholar opposed to
abortion and same sex marriage, to head the commission.”’ (Roth quoted in Risse 2020, p. 3. Also
see Roth 2019). Professor Mary Ann Glendon, George W. Bush’s Ambassador to the Holy See14,
chairs the Commission. Glendon is an internationally renowned scholar, a strong opponent of
abortion, in line with the conventional Catholic view (Mary Ann Glendon 2020). The remaining 10
members of the Commission were academics, philosophers, and activists. According to the official
biographies of the Commission members on the State Department website, five have particular human
rights expertise: Professor Paola Carozza, Dr. David Tse-Chien Pan, Dr. Katrina Lantos Swett15,
Rabbi Dr. Meir Soloveichik16, and Dr. Christopher Tollefsen (Commission on Unalienable Rights:
Member Bios n.d.).
Three of the 11 commissioners were women17 and two were “people of color”18. According to
Schmitt “LGBTQ, immigrant, indigenous, and disabled communities do not seem to be represented”
and, she asserted, “most” Commission members “are known opponents to LGBTQ and reproductive
rights” (Schmitt 2019). Verma (2020) reports that, according to critics, the Commission’s make-up
was not demographically or socially representative of today’s USA and, as a result, its conclusions
would necessarily be flawed. In addition, while the Commission was an advisory not a policy making
14 According to Rutten (2010), Glendon is a ‘conservative Catholic . . . who refused to accept an award from Notre Dame
[University] because it invited President Obama to speak at its commencement’. (https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-
2010-mar-31-la-oe-rutten31-2010mar31-story.html). Glendon garnered controversy for statements like The Boston Globe’s
receiving the Pulitzer Prize for its investigation into child abuse by priests “would be like giving the Nobel Peace Prize to
Osama bin Laden.” (Verma 2020).
15 Swett was USCIRF chair, 2012–2016.
16 According to Equity Forward, a human rights advocacy group, ‘Soloveichik is an orthodox rabbi and professor of Judaic
studies at Yeshiva University. He has ties to influential anti-abortion and anti-birth control groups including the Becket Fund
for religious Liberty and the Witherspoon Institute. Soloveichik has repeatedly argued against Affordable Health Care Act’s
birth control benefit and opposes marriage same-sex couples [and] individuals’ (https://equityfwd.org/meir-soloveichik).
17 Professor Mary Ann Glendon, Dr Jacqueline Rivers, and Dr Katrina Lantos Swett.
18 Dr. David Tse-Chien Pan, Professor of German at the University of California, Irvine and Dr. Jacqueline Rivers, Lecturer
in Sociology at Harvard University. Rivers believes that ‘marriage is a gift from God’ and that ‘sexual partnerships
between persons of the same sex are being legally recognized as “marriages,” thus abolishing in law the principle
of marriage as a conjugal union and reducing it to nothing other than sexual or romantic companionship’. (https:
//insidethevatican.com/magazine/people/eugene-jacqueline-rivers-scholar-protestant-minister/).
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body, it was feared that its focus on ‘natural rights’ could lead to undermining minorities’ rights.
Finally, it was feared “that the emphasis on natural law would mean a departure from the strong
antidiscrimination policy platform of the Obama administration” (Schmitt 2019; Montgomery 2020)
To hear views from invited human rights experts, the Commission was due to have six public
hearings between October 2019 and March 2020. Five meetings were held, although reportedly
“sparsely attended” (Verma 2020). The last scheduled meeting was not held because of the Covid-19
pandemic. The Commission’s conclusions were unknown at the time of writing this article (late
June 2020)19. In June 2020, Peter Berkowitz, a Stanford University philosopher, director of the State
Department’s Policy Planning Staff and the Commission’s executive secretary, published an essay at
RealClearPolitics20. While the essay presented Berkowitz’s personal views, it might be inferred that
it reflected some elements of the Commission’s thinking. Berkowitz notes that the Commission was
greeted with “skepticism and indignation . . . by human rights activists, former public officials, and
Capitol Hill lawmakers.” Critics regarded its work as unnecessary because both human rights and
America’s commitment to them were, Berkowitz claimed, “understood, settled, and uncontroversial”.
Criticism came from two ideological positions: “Influential voices on the left disparage the cause of
human rights as a vehicle for imposing Western hegemony. Powerful critics on the right regard the
institutionalized apparatus of the human rights movement as a thinly disguised system designed to
entrench progressive transnational government” (Berkowitz 2020).
The controversy hinges on a definitional issue: what are “unalienable” rights? Berkowitz contends
they are “those rights inherent in all persons”, captured in the 1776 Declaration of Independence.
He claims this ‘marked the first time in human history that a nation came into being by solemnizing
its commitment to “unalienable rights”, an experiment in “liberty under law” which resulted in
a country ”whose citizens enjoy a freedom, pluralism, and prosperity that few countries have
equaled” (Berkowitz 2020). Bob (2019b) notes that, regarding the principles of the 1776 Declaration of
Independence, America’s Revolutionary era in the late 18th and early 19th centuries was characterised
by a situation whereby “slaves, women and men without property experienced a notably different
reality”. In other words, not all Americans have historically enjoyed the same “unalienable” rights.
In addition, there is a second concern: the Commission was tasked to come up with findings to
justify a foreign policy focus prioritising religious freedom over other human rights (Schmitt 2019;
Human Rights Watch 2020; Human Rights First 2020; Verma 2020). Critics claim that the concept of
“unalienable” highlights rights the original late-18th century, Christian-informed, understanding of
the term. Posner (2019) also notes the archaic use of “unalienable” rather than “inalienable” normally
referring to Christian, especially Catholic, understandings21. Posner (2019) claims, finally, that, “given
what we know about the Trump administration’, it was highly likely to mean that by the use of “natural
law” the government would ‘argue that abortion and possibly other forms of family planning violate
“human rights”—that is, the sacrosanct right to life. If so, this would emphasise “religious rights and
freedoms as a matter of international human rights law”.
Law professors Huckerby and Knuckey (2020a) attended the Commission’s public meetings.
They claimed that the Commissioners used the body’s public meetings to:
• ‘demonstrate skepticism toward human rights treaties and institutions;
• assert the dubious claim that there are (sic.) a proliferation of human rights; and
• advance the idea that human rights are in need of prioritization or being placed into a hierarchy,
conceivably with freedom of religion trumping other rights.’ (Huckerby and Knuckey 2020a).
19 The Commission’s draft report was released on 16 July 2020. It is available at https://www.state.gov/draft-report-of-the-
commission-on-unalienable-rights/.
20 ‘At RealClearPolitics (RCP) we’re dedicated to providing our readers with better, more insightful analysis of the most
important news and policy issues of the day. RCP’s daily editorial curation and original reporting present balanced,
non-partisan analysis that empowers our readers to stay informed’ (https://www.realclearpolitics.com/about.html).
21 The Declaration of Independence refers to “unalienable rights” with which people “are endowed by their Creator”.
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Huckerby and Knuckey (2020a) also claim that the Commission’s meetings were noteworthy
for what they did not include: namely, any mention from the Commissioners of what some regard
as the Trump administration’s steady domestic human rights backsliding, apparent tolerance of
foreign dictators and authoritarians, and America’s gradual withdrawal from various multilateral
institutions, including those that seek to protect human rights, such as the UN Human Rights Council.
What the Commission did frequently reference, however, was the paramountcy of religious freedom.
According to David Kramer, assistant secretary of state for the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights
and Labor in the George W. Bush administration, “[t]his is about the only human right they seem
to care about . . . It seems to be a play for political support domestically, that could rebound to our
detriment in foreign policy” (Kramer quoted in Verma 2020).
Critics feared that the Commission would seek to validate the claim, made by the Commission’s
executive secretary, Peter Berkowitz, that America’s international “unalienable” rights policy should
draw on principles derived both from the Declaration of Independence and natural law22. If this was
the case, it might encourage Pompeo to reduce the human rights with which the USA’s IRF policy
is concerned. For Pompeo, we have noted, there are too many extant human rights and not all are
essential (or “unalienable”). Potential “inessential” human rights might include “gender emancipation
and reproductive rights”, religious freedom should take priority over other rights, and newly validated
unalienable rights would not be subject to “any international oversight” (Risse 2020, p. 3) and, in effect,
be “human rights with American characteristics”.
3. The Annual Ministerial to Advance Religious Freedom
With these concerns in mind, let us turn now to another of Secretary of State Pompeo’s innovations:
the annual Ministerial to Advance Religious Freedom.
Our nation is so special and it’s the greatest nation in the history of civilization. . . . Our
diplomats all around the world can be incredibly proud of the fact that they represent a
nation that has God-given rights ensconced in our fundamental founding documents . . . .
(Pompeo and Brownback 2019)
Pompeo frequently asserts that religious freedom is the ‘first liberty’, but it is not clear what
he means. It may be politically necessary to be ambiguous in this respect: the USA’s constitution
proclaims separation of church and state. Is Pompeo referring to the chronological order of the First
Amendment in the US Constitution? Or does he mean that it is his ideological preference that religious
freedom is the primary freedom, above other human rights, such as the right to equality and freedom
from discrimination? Maybe he means it in both senses.
Either way, his comments, as expressed in the quotation above, appear to show that Pompeo
personally believes that human rights should be placed in a hierarchy in order of importance, headed
by religious freedom. This is important because Pompeo presides over America’s foreign policy.
Launching the 2019 OIRF report, Pompeo stated that:
We’ve talked about religious freedom. We want to make sure every country has the
understanding how central that is to their nation’s success and how they shouldn’t let a
bureaucrat somewhere sitting in an international organization interfere with their country’s
sovereign desire to allow their citizens to practice their—to practice religious freedom.
(Pompeo 2020)
22 A letter, critical of the Commission, and signed by 167 human rights groups, was published in May 2020. They wrote ‘to
express [their] grave concern about the work of the U.S. State Department’s Commission on Unalienable Rights and any
potential report or output that undermines the international human rights system and purports to reinterpret its respective
treaties and monitoring bodies’. Letter available at https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/supporting_resources/050120_
lettertocour_crr_hrw_iwhc.pdf. Also see (Berschinksi and Wordern 2020).
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Pompeo claims that each country, without ‘interference’ from ‘a bureaucrat somewhere sitting in an
international organization’, should come up with its own unique, culturally and religiously-informed,
understanding of religious freedom. For the USA, this would be “human rights with American
characteristics”. It does not necessarily mean that this policy would protect all citizens’ human
rights—particularly if their rights seemed to deviate significantly from the majority religion’s view of
what are appropriate rights (a “country’s sovereign desire to allow their citizens to practice their—to
practice religious freedom’).
The first annual Ministerial to Advance Religious Freedom took place in July 2018. Its stated
purpose was to seek “outcomes that reaffirmed international commitments to promote religious freedom
and produce real, positive change” (Ministerial to Advance Religious Freedom 2018). The event
gathered around 350 faith ministers and activists from around 80 countries. Pompeo and the
Ambassador-at-Large for Religious Freedom, Sam Brownback, organised and hosted the event in
Washington, DC. In his opening speech, Pompeo highlighted the Trump administration’s priority of
religious freedom, both at home and abroad:
The Trump administration recognizes that religious freedom is a fundamental American
liberty, and this has been clear from the administration’s earliest days and indeed the earliest
days of our nation.
The United States advances religious freedom in our foreign policy because it is not exclusively
an American right. It is a God-given universal right bestowed on all of mankind. Seventy
years ago, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights affirmed this when 48 nations declared
that “everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion.”. (Pompeo 2018)
Vice-president Mike Pence also spoke at the Ministerial. Conveying greetings from President
Trump, Pence pledged to the gathering that “religious freedom” was the Trump administration’s
“top priority”, because it “is right. But we also do this because religious freedom is in the interest of
the peace and security of the world” (Pence quoted in Marsden 2020, p. 7). Pence chastised several
countries and other actors – including, China, Russia, Iran, Nicaragua, Turkey, and the Islamic State
—for egregious denials of religious freedom. McAlister (2019, p. 109) comments however that “Setting
aside how much of a beacon the US appeared to be, as President Trump courted leaders in Russia,
Saudi Arabia, and elsewhere, Pence also spoke about persecution in a way that disproportionately
highlighted the oppression of Christians, ignored the oppression of Muslims everywhere but China
and Iran, and conflated religious and ethnic oppression”. Finally, Pence announced formation of a
‘Genocide Recovery and Persecution Response Program’ and the launch of the Potomac Declaration,
which sought to build on Article 18 of the UDHR celebrating religious as a universal, God-given right
(Marsden 2020, p. 7; also see Casper 2019).
The second Ministerial was held in July 2019 in Washington, DC. It brought together over 1000
civil society representatives and religious leaders from about 100 countries. In his opening remarks,
Pompeo asserted that while all countries are different, they all aim to progress religious freedom.
He did not claim that this goal was the sole province of the USA, as it should become ‘normative’
both domestically and internationally (Marsden 2020). Pompeo’s remarks about normative standards
guiding a country’s religious freedom policy do not necessarily suggest that the rights of minorities
would be protected—if that policy is not a country’s norm: for example in the case of Myanmar,
where persecution of the Muslim Rohingyas is “genocidal” (McAlister 2019, p. 110). In conclusion,
what emerged from the two Ministerials was that the Trump administration’s IRF policy views religious
freedom as the primary human right.
4. The International Religious Freedom Alliance
We have focused on religious freedom, not just for Christians but for people of Jewish faith,
Muslims, all faiths, to make sure that every human being has the capacity and the will and a government
who will permit them to exercise their conscience, their rights; and then secondly to make sure that
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people understand that here in America our rights are, in fact, God-given. They didn’t come from
any government who gave them to us. We—they were bestowed upon us by God, and it is the
government’s role to make sure that those God-given rights are protected.
And the people of the United States should know that the world looks to us as a beacon.
They know that this is a special place. They know that God gave us this set of rights and our
founders set this course in motion for this great experiment . . . . (Dobson 2020)
Pompeo announced the formation of the US-led International Religious Freedom Alliance in
September 2019. Pompeo stated that it was “an alliance of likeminded nations devoted to confronting
religious persecution all around the world” (Banks 2020). In January 2020, Ambassador Sam Brownback
told reporters during a conference call that there was ‘a pretty high bar’ for countries to be included in the
Alliance. It was ‘the activist club of countries’, strongly in favour of religious freedom (Banks 2020)23.
The Alliance was launched in February 2020, with 27 founding members (Banks 2020)24.
Twenty-two (81%) have Christianity as their majority religion, four (14%) feature Islam as most
popular faith, and Israel (<0.5%) is the state of the Jews25.
Andrew Copson, Chief Executive of Humanists UK, welcomed ‘the Principles of the newly
established Alliance, including explicit protection of the non-religious’. Copson noted however that,
while ‘[s]ome members of the Alliance include strong defenders of freedom of religion or belief, such
as the Netherlands, [others] including, Brazil, Hungary, and Poland have regressive human rights
records’ (Copson 2020)26. Copson (2020) alleged that some members of the Alliance ‘do not have good
track records on upholding human rights, and have in fact used so-called “religious freedom” as a
justification for trampling on the rights and freedoms of others, including non-Christians, women, and
LGBT people’27. Sister Simone Campbell, executive director of the NETWORK Lobby for Catholic
Social Justice, criticised the Alliance’s composition. She was sceptical that its members comprise, as
Brownback claimed, ‘the activist club of countries’, strongly in favour of religious freedom. When she
first heard of the Alliance, she thought ‘the idea was [that] nations having difficulty providing for
religious freedom were joining together to try to improve’. She believed it was ‘shocking . . . that
Alliance members were lionised as “models for religious freedom’ as it seemed to indicate that the
Trump administration had a ‘very narrow perspective of what religious freedom is’ (Campbell quoted
in Schor 2020).
Does Campbell’s claim stand up that not all Alliance members have a good track record in regard
to religious freedom? While this is not the place to do an extensive survey of the religious freedom
policies of all Alliance members, below I comment briefly on where they stand in relation to social
acceptance of LGBTQ+ people and rights, and restrictions by the state and hostile non-state actors
collectively restricting religious beliefs and practices. The aim is to get a snapshot from 2020 on which
Alliance member states are “activists” to protect religious freedom.
Table 1 provides information on Alliance members, in relation to three specific indices: the Global
Acceptance, 2014–2017 (GAI), Government Religious Restrictions, 2017 (GRI) and the Social Hostilities
23 According to Casey (2020), “Secretary of State Pompeo, Ambassador at Large for International Religious Freedom Sam
Brownback, and USAID’s new religious freedom adviser Mark Kevin Lloyd all have a history of Islamophobic positions and
comments”.
24 Founding members of IRFA: Albania, Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Colombia, Croatia, Czech Republic,
Estonia, The Gambia, Georgia, Greece, Hungary, Israel, Kosovo, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, The Netherlands, Poland, Senegal,
Slovakia, Slovenia, Togo, Ukraine, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
25 All member states are Christian, except: Albania, Bosnia & Herzegovina, The Gambia, Israel, and Senegal. This suggests
that criteria for membership are two-fold: religious affiliation and whether a country is a U.S. ally.
26 Despite Copson’s concern, however, neither Brazil, Hungary, or Poland are included in the 28 “countries of concern” in
USCIRF’s 2019 (https://www.uscirf.gov/sites/default/files/2019USCIRFAnnualReport.pdf).
27 Alliance members identified as having ongoing religious freedom issues in the State Department’s 2018 annual report are
Hungary, led by a far-right government, and Austria (OIRF Office of International Religious Freedom).
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(SHI)28. Collectively, the three measures identify restrictions on religion, including in relation to certain
social groups, including LGBTQ+ entities.
Table 1. International Religious Freedom Alliance members’ restrictions on religion.
Country
Global Acceptance
Index (GAI), 2014–2017
(Higher the Better)
Government Religious
Restrictions Index (GRI),
2017 (Lower the Better)
Social Hostilities Index
(SHI) (Lower the Better)
Albania 3.5 1.6 0.1
Austria 6.8 4.2 3.2
Bosnia & Herzegovina 3.1 2.9 3.2
Brazil 6.8 1.3 4.3
Bulgaria 4.6 5.3 4.2
Colombia 5.9 2.0 2.2
Croatia 5.2 2.4 0.4
Czech Republic 6.0 3.3 2.6
Estonia 4.9 1.2 0.8
The Gambia 3.4 0.7 3.0
Georgia 2.7 3.5 3.1
Greece 5.0 4.3 5.1
Hungary 4.9 3.3 3.7
Israel 5.4 5.5 7.3
Kosovo 2.9 2.7 4.4
Latvia 4.4 2.6 1.2
Lithuania 4.1 2.5 0.6
Malta 7.6 2.1 0.8
The Netherlands 8.6 2.6 2.8
Poland 4.8 2.9 2.2
Senegal 1.7 1.2 1.0
Slovakia 5 3.0 2.7
Slovenia 5.9 2.6 0.2
Togo 3.0 2.1 0.8
Ukraine 3.3 3.8 7.1
United Kingdom 7.7 2.6 6.8
United States 7.2 3.3 4.4
Source: Adapted from Grim 2020, pp. 12–15.
First, there is patchy adhesion to LGBTQ+ rights among Alliance member states. Grim (2020)
reports that, “on average, support for LGBT rights is 41% higher in countries with low levels of social
hostilities involving religion”. Some Alliance members have relatively low SHI levels, scoring 1.0
or lower: Albania, Croatia, Estonia, Lithuania, Malta, Slovenia and Togo. Others have relatively
high SHI scores (>5.0): Greece, Israel, Ukraine, and the United Kingdom. Second, some Alliance
members have relatively high GRI scores (>4.0): Austria, Bulgaria, Greece, and Israel, and others score
relatively low in this measure (<2.0): Albania, Brazil, Estonia, The Gambia, and Senegal. Third, some
Alliance countries score relatively poorly on GAI (<3.0): Georgia, Kosovo, and Senegal, and others
score relatively highly (>6.0): Austria, Czech Republic, Malta, The Netherlands, the United Kingdom,
and the United States. In sum, no Alliance members score poorly on all of the measures identified
in Table 1, while only a minority does well in all three aspects. Nine—that is, a third of the Alliance
membership (Albania, Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, The Netherlands, Slovenia, and
Slovakia)—do relatively well on all three measures. The United States is not among them. These data
do not support Brownback’s claim—that is, the Alliance is ‘the activist club of countries’, strongly
activist in pursuing freedom for all.
28 “GAI seeks to measure the relative level of social acceptance of LGBT people and rights in each country at specific time
periods”. “GRI assesses the level of restrictions on religion by governments around the world” (Grim 2020, p. 11). “SHI
measures hostile acts by private individuals, organizations and social groups that restrict religious beliefs and practices”
(https://www.pewforum.org/2011/08/09/rising-restrictions-on-religion4/).
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If it is the case that not all Alliance members are countries which plausibly comprise “the activist
club of countries” in relation to religious freedom, as Brownback claims, what then is the strategic
value of the Alliance for US foreign policy? On the one hand, the Alliance purports to champion
international religious freedom, perhaps with a Christian prioritisation. But what of the US attack
on China over the government’s treatment of the Muslim Uighur minority? While this issue is not
about the plight of Christians, it does concern a country—China—that is a key global rival of the
USA. To attack its government over its treatment of a religious minority fulfils two goals: (1) critiques
China in an area in which it is vulnerable, and (2) indicates the USA’s foreign policy commitment to
minorities’ religious (and cultural) freedom. For the Trump administration’s domestic support base,
the anti-China policy highlights that the USA is willing “to take on” egregious deniers of “religious
freedom” such as China, while also implicitly castigating the country’s government for its denial of
human rights more generally. A particularistic approach to religious freedom and human rights is also
shown in the case of the Trump administration’s relationship with the rulers of Saudi Arabia. Among
the world’s most egregious deniers of the rights of religious minorities, including Christians, the Saudi
government is not criticised by the Trump administration for its approach. Instead, the importance to
the Trump administration of the Saudi government’s role regionally—that is, anti-Iran, anti-radical
political changes, pro-stability—easily takes precedence over any concerns that the administration may
have over the Saudi government’s treatment of its religious minorities (Fox 2016, pp. 126, 131)
5. Conclusions
Trump hopes by shouting “Religious Freedom for All,” his political base will mistake the
high decibel level for effectiveness. The gap between the rhetoric and the record is real. Only
a new administration can bring any change. (Casey 2020)
The aim of the article was to examine the USA’s IRF policy over time. The article examined
three claims in relation to the Trump administration: it (1) focuses primarily on religious freedom
for Christians (2) privileges Judeo-Christian values, and (3) undermines internationally females’ and
sexual minorities human rights. The first does not stand up to scrutiny: like previous administrations
the Trump presidency, via its IRF policy, has called out egregious violators of many faiths’ religious
freedom, including but by no means restricted to Christians.
The article indicated that the Trump administration actively pursued international religious
freedom. While this was not new, what was novel was the privileging of Judeo-Christian values.
It replaced a more flexible Christocentric approach, which characterised the three prior administrations:
the Clinton, Bush, and Obama presidencies. In contrast, the Trump administration’s approach was
contoured by ideological commitment to a Judeo-Christian view. Supporters of Judeo-Christian
values, including USCIRF vice-chair, Tony Perkins, congratulated the Trump administration for its
exemplary commitment to advancing international religious freedom. Critics saw the injection of
Judeo-Christian values into foreign policy as undermining the rights of women and sexual minorities.
Secretary of State, Michael R. Pompeo, was identified as a key figure in the development of US foreign
policy privileging Judeo-Christian values via three initiatives: the Commission on Unalienable Rights,
the annual Ministerial on Advancing Religious Freedom and the International Religious Freedom
Alliance. Not only were principles invoked from the 1776 Declaration of Independence but also the
1948 UDHR. Critics feared that international human rights developed over the decades since the UDHR
would, under Pompeo’s direction, be overlooked or regarded as non-essential. Post-UDHR, human
rights developments focus on those highlighting minorities’ rights, including those of females and
sexual minorities.
Concern was fuelled by one of the early acts of the Trump administration: to reinstitute the
so-called “Mexico City policy”, also known as the global gag rule, banning US government support
for international family planning programmes that “perform, promote or offer information about
abortion”. In addition, the Trump administration worked industriously at the United Nations (UN) to
remove all references to “sexual and reproductive health”, the term preferred by mainstream human
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rights activists (Bob 2019b). Several Trump administration appointees worked internationally to insert
anti-LGBTQ views into USA policy. For example, at the 2019 Commission on the Status of Women
(CSW) at the UN, the US delegation attempted to remove “gender-responsive” language from CSW
exit documents. US Ambassador at the UN, Cherith Norman Chalet, stated in a speech at the event
that “we are not about gender jargon . . . we are about women and girls”. Some saw this as an effort to
weaken the rights of non-binary individuals, in line with the Trump administration’s broader attacks
on the LGBTQ community (Ford 2019; Verma 2020).
Concerns about the rights of women and LBBTQ+ communities were not restricted to events
at the UN. A chief US ally, Poland, held a presidential election in early July 2020. The winner was
Andrzej Duda, a vociferous critic of LGBTQ+ rights, who narrowly triumphed over Rafal Trzaskowski,
the liberal mayor of Warsaw. During his presidency, Duda, pledged to “defend children from LGBT
ideology”. Duda is a friend and ally of President Trump (FP Editors 2019). Poland was due to host the
third annual Ministerial to Advance Religious Freedom between 14–16 July 2020 (U.S.-Poland Joint
Statement on Ministerial to Advance Religious Freedom 2020). However, the third ministerial appears
to have been postponed or cancelled due to the Covid-19 pandemic, although no official statement to
that effect seems to have been issued.
Pompeo restated his opposition to same-sex marriage in July 2018 during his confirmation hearing
before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Sarah Kate Ellis, president and CEO of the LGBTQ+
rights group GLAAD, stated that ‘Mike Pompeo’s reaffirmed opposition to marriage equality and
LGBTQ rights further proves that he is dangerously wrong to serve as our nation’s chief diplomat . . .
His personal ties to anti-LGBTQ hate groups and clear refusal to support the hard-fought equal rights
of the LGBTQ community make him wholly unqualified to promote human rights abroad’ (Brammer
2018). Finally, Gevisser (2020) remarks that “during his presidency, Donald Trump has rolled back
transgender rights as part of his efforts to consolidate his conservative Evangelical base, for whom
‘gender ideology’ has become the new evil; the latest bulwark against assaults on ‘the family’ now
that same-sex marriage was legal and supported by a majority of Americans.” (Gevisser quoted in
Tóibín 2020).
The article has sought to balance the views of those who believe that the Trump regime has advanced
international religious freedom with critical voices that accuse it of discriminatory behaviour at home
and abroad. Recent Pew surveys indicate that many Americans see a rise in discriminatory behaviour
in the USA during the Trump presidency. For example, the “public has negative views of the country’s
racial progress; more than half say Trump has made race relations worse” (Pew Research Center 2019).
It can be hypothesised that the Trump administration’s religious freedom policy encourages the rise of
hate crimes and hostility toward some minority faiths in America, as well as to exacerbate tensions over
religion, race and ethnicity internationally (for example, Trump’s strong support for Israel) (Haynes
2019, pp. 141, 170). It would also be interesting to examine and probe international religious leaders’
responses to the Trump administration’s Judeo-Christian approach and to consider how such policies
have been received by human rights advocacy groups in countries experiencing religious conflict or
the oppression of religious minorities (for example, China, Russia, Myanmar, Syria, Yemen, Pakistan,
Turkey). While the current article does not examine these issues due to lack of space, their examination
suggests a fruitful avenue for future research.
The issue of religious freedom in the USA was highlighted because of President Trump’s appearance
holding a Bible outside St. John’s Episcopal church in Washington, D.C. on 1 June 2020 in the aftermath
of the killing of George Floyd by a police officer. Some Episcopalian leaders accused the president of
using the church for a photo opportunity and expressed outrage that law enforcement dispersed the
crowd of overwhelmingly peaceful demonstrators proclaiming that “Black Lives Matter.” The response
suggests that not all American Christians are united in supporting Trump’s religious freedom policies.
This issue—that is, intrafaith, and intradenominational difference—could also usefully be addressed
by further research.
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The November 2020 US presidential election is between Donald Trump and Obama’s former
vice-president, Joe Biden. It is unclear the extent to which the USA’s IRF policy would alter if the
presidency changed from Trump to Biden. During the quarter century since Bill Clinton signed IRFA,
the USA has clearly shown commitment to seeking to end religious persecution around the world. It is
less clear, however, if the current US approach would change very much if the presidency changes
hands. Adherence to Judeo-Christian values is unlikely significantly to diminish in Congress and
elsewhere even if Biden, who may well not be a supporter of such values, wins. In addition, both
Mike Pompeo and Mike Pence are likely presidential contenders in 2024. If either becomes president,
then the Judeo-Christian turn in America’s IRF policy looks set to continue.
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